Hírolvasó
Woodruff: Weird architectures weren't supported to begin with
What’s the point of this spiel? It’s precisely what happened to pyca/cryptography: nobody asked them whether it was a good idea to try to run their code on HPPA, much less System/390; some packagers just went ahead and did it, and are frustrated that it no longer works. People just assumed that it would, because there is still a norm that everything flows from C, and that any host with a halfway-functional C compiler should have the entire open source ecosystem at its disposal.
Fish shell 3.2.0 released
Kernel prepatch 5.12-rc1
So I was actually without electricity for six days of the merge window, and was seriously considering just extending the merge window to get everything done. As you can tell, I didn't do that. To a large part because people were actually very good about sending in their pull requests, so by the time I finally got power back, everything was nicely lined up and I got things merged up ok. But partly this is also because 5.12 is a smaller release than some previous ones.
What security does a default OpenBSD installation offer? (by solene@)
The first paragraph of the introduction reads,
In this text I will explain what makes OpenBSD secure by default when you install it. Do not take this for a security analysis, but more like a guide to help you understand what is done by OpenBSD to have a secure environment. The purpose of this text is not to compare OpenBSD to other OSes but to say what you can honestly expect from OpenBSD.
A worthy reminder of how the system works, and a very handy piece to show to anybody who wonders why one would choose to use OpenBSD over anything else. You can read the whole thing here.
dhcpleased(8) - DHCP client daemon
With the following commit, Florian Obser (florian@) imported dhcpleased(8), DHCP daemon to acquire IPv4 address leases from servers, plus dhcpleasectl(8), a utility to control the daemon:
CVSROOT: /cvs Module name: src Changes by: florian@cvs.openbsd.org 2021/02/26 09:16:37 Added files: sbin/dhcpleased: Makefile bpf.c bpf.h checksum.c checksum.h control.c control.h dhcpleased.8 dhcpleased.c dhcpleased.h engine.c engine.h frontend.c frontend.h log.c log.h usr.sbin/dhcpleasectl: Makefile dhcpleasectl.8 dhcpleasectl.c parser.c parser.h Log message: Import dhcpleased(8) - a dhcp daemon to acquire IPv4 address leases from servers.Mageia 8 has been released
West: Post-Spectre web development
[$] Lockless patterns: relaxed access and partial memory barriers
Stable kernels 5.11.2, 5.10.19, and 5.4.101
GNU poke 1.0 released
Security updates for Friday
Rusty Russell: A Model for Bitcoin Soft Fork Activation
TL;DR: There should be an option, taproot=lockintrue, which allows users to set lockin-on-timeout to true. It should not be the default, though.
As stated in my previous post, we need actual consensus, not simply the appearance of consensus. I’m pretty sure we have that for taproot, but I would like a template we can use in future without endless debate each time.
- Giving every group a chance to openly signal for (or against!) gives us the most robust assurance that we actually have consensus. Being able to signal opposition is vital, since everyone can lie anyway; making opposition difficult just reduces the reliability of the signal.
- Developers should not activate. They’ve tried to assure themselves that there’s broad approval of the change, but that’s not really a transferable proof. We should be concerned about about future corruption, insanity, or groupthink. Moreover, even the perception that developers can set the rules will lead to attempts to influence them as Bitcoin becomes more important. As a (non-Bitcoin-core) developer I can’t think of a worse hell myself, nor do we want to attract developers who want to be influenced!
- Miner activation is actually brilliant. It’s easy for everyone to count, and majority miner enforcement is sufficient to rely on the new rules. But its real genius is that miners are most directly vulnerable to the economic majority of users: in a fork they have to pick sides continuously knowing that if they are wrong, they will immediately suffer economically through missed opportunity cost.
- Of course, economic users are ultimately in control. Any system which doesn’t explicitly encode that is fragile; nobody would argue that fair elections are unnecessary because if people were really dissatisfied they could always overthrow the government themselves! We should make it as easy for them to exercise this power as possible: this means not requiring them to run unvetted or home-brew modifications which will place them at more risk, so developers need to supply this option (setting it should also change the default User-Agent string, for signalling purposes). It shouldn’t be an upgrade either (which inevitably comes with other changes). Such a default-off option provides both a simple method, and a Schelling point for the lockinontimeout parameters. It also means much less chance of this power being required: “Si vis pacem, para bellum“.
This triumverate model may seem familiar, being widely used in various different governance systems. It seems the most robust to me, and is very close to what we have evolved into already. Formalizing it reduces uncertainty for any future changes, as well.
[$] Fedora and fallback DNS servers
Security updates for Thursday
resolvd(8) - daemon to handle nameserver configuration
With the following commit, Florian Obser (florian@) imported resolvd(8), a daemon for handling nameserver configuration:
CVSROOT: /cvs Module name: src Changes by: florian@cvs.openbsd.org 2021/02/24 11:10:41 Added files: sbin/resolvd : Makefile resolvd.8 resolvd.c Log message: Import resolvd(8), a daemon to rewrite resolv.conf. prodding deraadtSince the initial import, resolvd(8) has seen: