Katonai bázisokon is landoltak hamis Cisco eszközök az évtized átverésével

Most bezzeg jaj de alaposan megvizsgálják? Mint anno a Supermicro alaplapokra rakott hardveres/szoftveres backdoor-t, 2018-ban? Abból bizony a DoD is kapott... lásd: https://9to5mac.com/2021/02/12/super-micro-spy-chip-story/

Mindenki kémkedik, a kínaiak is. Az amcsik is, a hatályos törvények szerint az összes amerikai informatikai termékbe kötelesek backdoor-t építeni, ha a kormány kéri őket erre, és ezt a nyilvánosság előtt le kell tagadniuk - ez is része a törvénynek. Ezért vicces, mikor pl. az Apple melldöngetve nyilatkozza, hogy ők bezzeg senkinek nem szolgáltatnak ki semmit.

Hasonló van szerintem a legtöbb országban is a világon.

Ha a titkárnő dugja bele a LAN kábeleket, akkor senki nem is fogja észrevenni a csalást. 

Mondjuk a Cisco a legnagyobb kókler, amikor összevásárol minden kínai garázscéget, aztán eladja a gagyi switch-eiket a saját nevén valami hangzatos Small and Medium Business Switch és hasonló parasztvakító termékkategóriában. A szerencsétlen IOS-hez szokott vevő meg csak néz, hogy ez meg már nem ismeri a megszokott parancsokat.

[..]Onur Aksoy, 40, of Miami, ran at least 19 companies formed in New Jersey and Florida, as well as approximately 15 Amazon  storefronts and at least 10 eBay storefronts (collectively, the “Pro Network Entities”), that imported from suppliers in China and Hong Kong tens of thousands of low-quality, modified computer networking devices with counterfeit Cisco labels, stickers, boxes, documentation, and packaging, all bearing counterfeit trademarks registered and owned by Cisco, that made the goods falsely appear to be new, genuine, and high-quality devices manufactured and authorized by Cisco. The devices had an estimated total retail value of hundreds of millions of dollars. The Pro Network Entities generated over $100 million in revenue, and Aksoy received millions of dollars for his personal gain.

The devices the Pro Network Entities imported from China and Hong Kong were typically older, lower-model products – some of which had been sold or discarded – which Chinese counterfeiters then modified to appear to be genuine versions of new, enhanced, and more expensive Cisco devices. The Chinese counterfeiters often added pirated Cisco software and unauthorized, low-quality, or unreliable components – including components to circumvent technological measures added by Cisco to the software to check for software license compliance and to authenticate the hardware. To make the devices appear new, genuine, high-quality, and factory-sealed by Cisco, the Chinese counterfeiters added counterfeited Cisco labels, stickers, boxes, documentation, packaging, and other materials.

Fraudulent and counterfeit products sold by the Pro Network Entities suffered from numerous performance, functionality, and safety problems. Often, they would simply fail or otherwise malfunction, causing significant damage to their users’ networks and operations – in some cases, costing users tens of thousands of dollars. Customers of Aksoy’s fraudulent and counterfeit devices included hospitals, schools, and government agencies. Furthermore, a review by the government and its private-sector partners discovered numerous counterfeit devices originating from the Pro Network Entities being used in highly sensitive military and governmental applications – including classified information systems – some involving combat and non-combat operations of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Army, including platforms supporting the F-15, F-18, and F-22 fighter jets, AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, and B-52 Stratofortress bomber aircraft.[..]
 

https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/ceo-dozens-companies-sentenced-78-mo…